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ARGUMENT 
Appellee wants to make this case, and Appellant's appeal, about what the experts 
have and have not established regarding a structural engineer's duty of reasonable care. 
Both the trial court's and Appellee's emphasis on experts and reasonable care is 
misplaced. Appellant has appealed the trial court's ruling that granted a once-denied 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Appellant's claim for breach of contract. The 
admission or denial of expert testimony regarding standard of care, while also important, 
is only a minor part of this appeal. 
The main issue of this Appeal is the trial court's decision to completely reverse 
itself, without basis, and to ignore specific, controverted facts regarding the content, 
scope, and meaning of the contract at issue. Such a decision was incorrect, as a trial court 
cannot reject genuine issues of material fact and weigh evidence. Appellant's breach of 
contract claim does not rely upon any aspect of his expert's testimony, and the trial 
court's dismissal of his claim on the basis of inadmissible expert testimony was legally 
incorrect. 
Appellant does not dispute that he has also appealed the trial court's decision to 
bar Plaintiffs expert from testifying at trial. However, the appeal focuses not on the 
substance of the decision that the trial court made to bar the expert evidence (because 
there is no substantive record of qualifications), but on the procedure that the trial court 
followed to reach that decision. Appellant did not have the chance to present the 
foundational evidence that would have allowed the trial court to make a substantive 
decision on the admissibility of Appellant's expert testimony. The trial court abused its 
l 
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discretion when it arbitrarily modified the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and prevented 
Appellant from providing the trial court with the expert's qualifications. In essence, the 
trial court never actually decided whether or not the Appellant's expert was qualified to 
testify at trial, because the trial court short-circuited the process established by the Utah 
Supreme Court for making such a decision. By disqualifying Appellant's expert prior to 
allowing Appellant to even attempt to lay foundation supporting the admissibility of the 
expert's testimony, the trial court abused its discretion. This Court must analyze the trial 
court's use of its discretion in that procedural decision, for that prefatory decision is the 
decision that allowed the trial court to make all of its subsequent rulings regarding 
Appellant's expert. 
L THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Appellee's contention that Appellant could not prevail on his breach of contract 
claim without establishing the relevant standard of care is wrong. As demonstrated in 
Appellant's opening brief, a claim for breach of contract does not require the imposition 
of any outside, legally-recognized duty or standard of care. When considering a claim for 
breach of contract, the parties' obligations to one another flow from the contractual 
agreement that the parties themselves made. (See Appellants' Brief at p. 17.) Appellant 
has not alleged that Appellee breached a duty of skill or care, but rather that the plans that 
Appellee created were deficient, unsuitable, and not compliant with Appellee's 
contractual obligation to provide structural engineering plans for construction of 
Appellant's building upon Appellant's property. (See R. at 3.) 
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Appellee ignores Appellant's argument and simply insists that, without a 
competing standard of care from Appellant, there is no dispute that can be raised as to the 
scope of the parties' bargain and obligations to one another. Appellee's argument misses 
the point. Appellant does not dispute that expert testimony is required to establish a 
standard of care; Appellant disputes that he is required, in support of his claim for breach 
of contract, to establish a standard of care. No such obligation exists in Utah, and the trial 
court erred when it created one.1 
A. Opinions that speak to the necessity of establishing a standard of care in 
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty cases do not govern inquiries as to disputed 
obligations of a contract. 
In support of its argument that Appellant was obligated to establish a standard of 
care to pursue his breach of contract claim, Appellee relies upon three Utah cases that do 
not address, in any way, claims for breach of contract. For example, in Wycalls v. 
Guardian Title of Utah, the Court of Appeals analyzed a litigant's claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In Chadwick v. Nielsen, the Court of 
Appeals analyzed a litigant's claim for medical malpractice against a doctor. 763 P.2d 
817 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Nauman v. HaroldK. Beecher & Assocs., the Utah Supreme 
Court also analyzed a litigant's claim for negligence against an architect. 467 P.2d 610 
(Utah 1970). To the extent that these three cases speak to the requirement that an expert, 
1
 Appellee's contention that analysis of the trial court's rejection of the expert testimony 
should come before analysis of the trial court's ruling on summary judgment is not 
applicable to this case. As stated above (and very clearly throughout Appellant's opening 
Brief), the summary judgment decision and the expert testimony decision are different. 
The trial court was wrong in both decisions, but that does not somehow make the trial 
court's decision regarding summary judgment dependent upon the trial court's decision 
regarding expert testimony. 
3 
< 
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not a lay witness, provide evidence to establish a standard of care, Appellant does not 
dispute their applicability. However, to the extent that Appellee or the trial court relied on 
these cases to support a position that Appellant was obligated to establish a standard of 
care in this case simply to support any claim for breach of contract, not one of these cases 
stands for that proposition. 
B. The National Housing case is not instructive, as its facts regarding the breach of 
contract claim are far different than the facts in this case. 
Appellee's reliance upon National Housing Industries, Inc. v. E.L. Jones 
Development, Co., 576 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978), is misplaced, as is Appellee's 
contention that this Court favorably adopted the holding within National Housing in 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah. Utah has not adopted National Housing as 
authoritative when considering a breach of contract claim. Furthermore, National 
Housing did not stand for the proposition that standard of care analysis is required in a 
breach of contract claim. 
L. Wycalis" § reference to National Housing is not relevant to this case. 
That this Court, in Wycalis, positively cited the National Housing case is not 
compelling. The Wycalis court simply referentially addressed National Housing in 
support of a contention that expert testimony is "helpful in elucidating the standard of 
care." 780 P.2d at 826, n. 8. Again, as stated above, Appellant does not dispute this point. 
The Wycalis court did not even consider a breach of contract claim anywhere within the 
opinion and nowhere did it state that a plaintiff must establish a standard of care in order 
to sue an engineer for breach of contract. Despite Appellee's claim, the Wycalis court did 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not cite National Housing favorably for any legal issue or other reason that is relevant to 
the issue on appeal. 
2L National Housing is inapplicable to this case. 
Appellee's explanation and analysis of National Housing is incomplete. Once the 
entire case is actually analyzed, it is clear that National Housing is both factually 
distinguishable and legally irrelevant to this Court's analysis of this case. As to the facts, 
it is imperative to understand that, in National Housing, the plaintiff (National Housing) 
was not the party that actually entered into the contract at issue (E.L. Jones Development, 
the assignor, was), but rather was an assignee of that contract. 576 P.2d at 1376. National 
Housing, as assignee, claimed that the contract always contemplated that the engineer 
would include a cut and fill estimate within its original plans, and that by not doing so, 
the engineer breached the contract. Id. However, National Housing's argument was 
specifically controverted by E.L. Jones Development, the party that actually executed the 
contract with the engineer. The president of E.L. Jones Development, who actually 
executed the contract, testified at a deposition "that the contract he entered into on behalf 
of E.L. Jones Development with the engineer "did not contemplate that the defendant 
would prepare cut and fill estimates and that such estimates would not be provided unless 
specifically requested." Id. at 1378. 
As shown above, in National Housing, both parties to the contract testified, 
unequivocally, that no cut and fill estimates were contemplated by the contract. There 
was no ambiguity as to the specific terms of the contract, and National Housing, as a 
plaintiff, attempted to attack the contract by imposing a superseding duty upon the 
5 
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engineer. It was in that context that the court in National Housing analyzed the necessity 
of, and required showings for, a standard of care. 
Such an exercise is not applicable to this case. Appellant has specifically 
controverted Appellee's version of the contract at issue through sworn testimony. In 
response to Appellant's position that he never agreed to any version of a page 2, Appellee 
presented two different versions of the page 2 to which Appellant purportedly agreed. 
Therefore, in this case, unlike in National Housing, the parties that executed the contract 
do dispute the contents of the contract, and a genuine issue of fact exists as to the terms 
of the parties' agreement within that contract. 
Therefore, the factual starting point for the analysis of Appellant's contract claim 
is far different than the starting point in National Housing, and for that reason, National 
Housing's reliance upon a standard of care analysis is inapposite to the straightforward 
breach of contract analysis that faces this Court in this case. Again, as explained in 
Appellant's opening Brief, the trial court initially ruled that this dispute regarding the 
terms of the contract created an ambiguity that foreclosed Appellee's entitlement to 
summary judgment. That ruling by the trial court was the correct ruling, as it reserved, for 
the factfinder, the opportunity to determine what contract the parties actually created. For 
whatever reason, the trial court later eschewed that viable position and instead created a 
herer-to-fore non-existent, overarching requirement that Appellant demonstrate that 
Appellee violated a standard of care. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C Only if a factfinder decides that the disputed page 2 was actually apart of the 
contract would the issue of Appellee }s standard of care be relevant. 
The contractual issue of an engineer's standard of care will only be relevant if the 
factfinder decides that Appellant did, in fact, agree to the terms within some version of 
the page 2 of Appellee's standard form contract. This is because it is on that page 2 that 
Appellee states that its contractual performance is not subject to any warranty and that its 
perfonnance "will be in accordance with a degree of care and skill generally exercised by 
professionals performing similar work under similar circumstances." (R. at 148.) 
However, as explained above, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or 
not page 2 is part of the contract. If it is not part of the contract, then the standard of care 
analysis is irrelevant. The trial court was not entitled to overlook the ambiguities of the 
contract and unilaterally decide that page 2 was, in fact, part of the contract. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO NOT ALLOW APPELLANT TO 
PROFFER THE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HIS 
EXPERT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The trial court's decision to bar Appellant's expert from testifying without 
allowing Appellant the chance to lay any foundation for the admissibility of that expert's 
testimony was unjustified and unsupportable. Despite clear procedural rules that gave 
Appellant the right to respond to the Motion in Limine and case law that laid out the 
exact process that the trial court should follow when deciding whether an expert was 
qualified, the trial court neither followed the procedural rules nor the process for deciding 
whether Appellant's expert was qualified to testify. The trial court cut Appellant off from 
7 
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the opportunity to present foundational evidence that, under Utah law, he was required, 
and entitled, to present. 
A. The trial court's decision to shorten the briefing timeframe without giving prior 
notice was an abuse of discretion and it substantially affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. 
The trial court's decision to shorten the briefing time led the trial court to declare 
that it believed that Appellee's Motion in Limine was unopposed. (R. at 713.) The trial 
court then soon after not only granted the Motion in Limine as unopposed, but reopened, 
sua sponte, a previously denied Motion for Summary Judgment and reversed its decision. 
To claim that the trial court's decision to shorten the briefing time and consider 
Appellee's Motion unopposed was inconsequential is not at all accurate. The trial court's 
decision regarding the "unopposed" Motion in Limine precipitated every other incorrect 
ruling that the trial court made. For the reasons elucidated in the initial Brief, the trial 
court did, in fact, abuse its discretion when it shortened Appellant's time to respond to 
the Motion in Limine. That decision was not inconsequential, and it certainly affected the 
outcome of Appellant's case. It should be reversed. 
B. The trial court's decision to bar admission of Appellant's expert's testimony 
without allowing Appellant to proffer his qualifications was an abuse of 
discretion. 
Mr. Nordquist, the Appellant's expert, did elucidate a standard of care within his 
report and during his deposition. (R. at 53-69, 271, 323; see Appellant's Brief at pp. 19-
20.) The trial court disregarded this opinion, and refused to allow Appellant to even 
officially proffer foundation in support of Mr. Nordquist's qualifications to give 
testimony as to Appellee's standard of care. 
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Mr. Nordquist opined about a standard of care that applies to all engineers, 
regardless of their specialty. (R. at 271.) By ruling at the time and in the manner that it 
did, the trial court did not allow Appellant any opportunity even to attempt to lay the 
necessary foundation to satisfy the requirements that the Utah Supreme Court elucidated 
in Boice v. Marble. 1999 UT 71, f 14, 982 P.2d 565 (stating that an expert can testify 
outside of his or her specialty if the foundation laid by the party presenting the expert 
establishes that the standards of care observed by the two specialties are the same and 
that the expert has the independent knowledge regarding the other specialty's standard of 
care). (See also Appellee's Brief at 21.) There is no way for this Court to evaluate the 
trial court's substantive decision regarding the admissibility of Mr. Nordquist's opinion 
because the trial court prematurely terminated the process of establishing Mr. Nordquist's 
credentials. This Court cannot decide whether or not Mr. Nordquist was qualified to 
testify, because Appellant had no chance even to create a record of Mr. Nordquist's 
specific qualifications. 
Appellee's claim that Mr. Nordquist was not qualified to provide expert testimony 
regarding Appellee's standard of care is just as unsupportable, because Appellee can only 
rely upon Mr. Nordquist's status as a geotechnical, rather than a structural, engineer. (See 
Appellee's Brief at p. 21.) As demonstrated in Boice, simply asserting that an expert does 
not share the same specialty as the subject of the expert testimony is not sufficient to 
justify disqualification of the expert. 1999 UT 71, f 14. Therefore, Appellee's contention 
that "Ross failed to make the threshold showing of competency required by Utah Rule of 
9 
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Evidence 702" (Appellee's Brief at p. 23) has no basis, because Appellant was never 
given the chance to make such a threshold showing. 
CONCLUSION 
Genuine issues of material fact exist that precluded the trial court from entering 
summary judgment against Appellant. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it barred Plaintiff from introducing Mr. Nordquist's expert testimony at trial. The 
Court should reverse the trial court's rulings. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of January 2012. 
HILL^QffiTSC^ & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Aaron R. Harris 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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